A sacred command of reason? Deceit, deception, and dishonesty in nurse education

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Abstract
Kant (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals. Hackett, Indianapolis, 1797) described honesty as ‘a sacred command of reason’ which should be obeyed at all times and at any cost. This study inquires into the practice of dishonesty, deception, and deceit by universities in the UK in the pursuit of quality indicators such as league table positions, Research Excellence Framework (REF) scores, and student satisfaction survey results. Deception occurs when the metrics which inform these tables and surveys are manipulated to suggest an improvement in quality when, in fact, the raised scores are merely the result of clever strategic planning. Deceit occurs when these manipulated scores are deliberately and knowingly presented as real improvements in research and educational quality. It might be argued that, within the context of the artificial ivory tower world of academe, this is a game played by almost every academic in every higher education institution with no real losers and little wider consequence. However, this study suggests that some of the strategies employed by institutions to improve their scores without directly addressing the issue of quality can, in certain practice-based disciplines such as nursing, result in dire consequences for practitioners and service users. It concludes with a number of suggestions taken from personal experience to resolve the tension between the contractual demands placed on nurse academics by their employers and the moral and practical obligations of their professional body, most notably the use of subversion. The conclusion, contra Kant, is that the most effective strategy against dishonesty and deception is often more dishonesty and deception.

Keywords: ethics, professional ethics.
To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is therefore a sacred command of reason prescribing unconditionally, one not to be restricted by any conveniences. Emanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy

All this happened, more or less. Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse 5

Introduction

The two epigraphs cited above more or less sum up the scope of this study. It is, on the one hand, an enquiry into dishonesty and its two cousins’ deceptiveness and deceitfulness in the context of nurse education. In particular, it identifies a number of deceptions (if not deceits) perpetrated by the university towards meeting its own ends, and questions the extent to which these deceptions conflict with the ends of nursing and nurse education. It is also a first person account, which is to say, all this (more or less) happened. However, by definition, it happened to one person within a certain context during a certain time period in a limited number of locations. As is the case with all qualitative accounts from the personal experiences of small samples (in this case, \( n = 1 \)), its transferability to other settings depends largely on its resonance with the reader. I therefore invite you to draw your own conclusions regarding its veracity and verisimilitude and to apply it as you see fit.

Deceit, deception, and dishonesty

One way of thinking about these 3Ds of nurse education is to imagine them as a continuum with deception at one end and deceit at the other. Thus, deception involves misleading someone more or less honestly, or at least not dishonestly. When a stage magician appears to pull a coin from someone’s ear, there is no real implication that the coin was actually in the ear. Indeed, most stage magicians will cheerfully admit that trickery was involved, although few if any will reveal the precise nature of the trick, and part of the pleasure in witnessing the act of deception is trying to work out how it was accomplished. In these cases, the swiftness of the hand has deceived the eye, but the brain understands the truth of the situation. In contrast, deceit usually has the implication of dishonest trickery and may involve outright lies. In any case, it usually attracts a negative moral judgment, and most people would probably prefer to be described as deceptive rather than deceitful.

Somewhere between deception and deceit lies dishonesty. For many people, dishonesty is morally ambiguous. It involves the telling of lies, but it is generally accepted that some lies (so-called white lies) are less bad than others, and that some might actually be a force for good. Recall Kant’s moral dilemma about whether it would ever be right to tell a lie to a murderer at the door in order to save someone’s life (Kant, 1797:1993). Kant’s conclusion is that it would not, that the means never justify the end, as all ethical decisions should be based on rational decisions and we can never rationally anticipate with any certainty the ends of our actions. He also invoked his categorical imperative that we should always act according to the maxim that our actions should become a universal law (Kant, 1785:1993). Thus, if we lie, we are willing that lying should be universal which, for Kant, would lead to a breakdown of social order. Most reasonable people, however, would probably argue the opposite; that they would be prepared to tell a lie if it saved an innocent (or even a guilty) life, even perhaps (as in Kant’s example) if, instead of saving the victim, the lie inadvertently contributed to her or his death. Furthermore, many would argue that never telling lies is just as likely to lead to social breakdown as always lying.

The examples which follow, which are all (more or less) taken from my own experiences, are largely accounts of deception and occasional dishonesty. That applies equally to my own behaviour as it does to that of my colleagues and the institutional body as a whole. In almost every case, the perpetrators felt that they were acting for the best. In some cases, perhaps the means justified the ends and they actually were. The disagreement and ethical dispute is not so much about whether or not the actors were attempting to do the right thing as to what actually counted as the right thing to do. This, then, is the crux of the matter: when faced with clear conflicts of interest, in
the case to be discussed here between the interests of our employers and the interests of the nursing profession, which side should we take and to what lengths might we go in order to do what we consider to be the right thing?

Lies, damn lies, and metrics

As universities in the UK are forced to compete more and more for funding and students, there are increasing demands to support quality claims with hard statistics. Universities can now plot their relative standing in research, teaching, student satisfaction and other indicators of ‘excellence’ according to their positions in a variety of league tables, all of which attempt to translate quality into quantity. For example, the Research Excellence Framework (REF), which is used by the UK government to allocate research funding, takes into account statistics such as the size of research grants awarded to departments and the impact factor of the journals in which papers are published. Impact factor itself is a quantitative measure of the number of citations that papers have received, and journals are therefore also subject to competitive ranking based on their impact and influence. Teaching quality is currently quantified according to factors such as the proportion of first class degrees awarded and student completion rates. In these examples, the more ‘good’ degrees awarded and the fewer students who leave the course, the higher the educational standard of the department is considered to be, although in both cases a strong argument could be made for the opposite. In addition, students’ satisfaction with their courses is becoming increasingly important, and this is typically measured in the UK using Likert scales and other quantitative measures.

One of the most prestigious league tables in the field of higher education is the Times Higher World Rankings, which judges universities according to 13 criteria (Times Higher Education, 2015a). Some of the quantitative measures used in the rankings include:

- The number of citations of research publications
- The ratio of publications to staff numbers
- The amount of research income from industry
- Numbers of doctorates awarded
- Income from student recruitment

These metrics demonstrate clearly how the quality of the processes of research and education is converted to quantities and outcomes in order that they might be measured and compared. Clearly, scoring highly on these and other metrics is extremely important as they attract students (and their fees), research funding, high quality staff (i.e. staff who already score highly on the relevant metrics) and general kudos to those universities with a high standing in the league tables. It is therefore unsurprising that most universities in the UK devote a great deal of time and resources to improving their scores. Most will have working groups, committees, and strategies, ready at a moment’s notice to respond to whichever variables are introduced by the league table compilers and government funding bodies.

University missions and agendas are therefore driven to a great extent by external forces. For example, until relatively recently, pure, disinterested, ‘blue skies’ research was typically held up as the academic gold standard. With the introduction of a new category of ‘impact’ in the most recent REF assessment exercise, universities are now eulogizing the importance of practical research and are pouring their resources into ‘real-world’ projects, albeit only those defined by the REF as ‘impactful’. Similarly, the introduction of student satisfaction surveys and upfront fees has influenced philosophies of teaching and the relationship between universities and their students. Whereas in the Enlightenment university of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries students were regarded as partners in the quest for knowledge, they are now treated as customers with consumer rights who must be kept satisfied lest they respond negatively or the surveys and take their business elsewhere.

These shifts in the philosophy and mission of the university in response to governmental and other external nudges have worrying implications for academic freedom and the post-Enlightenment educational project in general. This study will focus on
the strategies employed by some universities in responding to these nudges and will address itself to the question: *At what point does strategy shade into deception?* More specifically, it will explore the issue of whether it is dishonest or even deceitful to pass off improved scores in these various measures as actual improvements in quality regardless of any real-life effects. For example, it is not difficult to see how the *Times Higher World Rankings* quality indicators listed above could be optimized without making the slightest difference to the actual quality of research and education which they are supposedly measuring. We might even question whether, in some cases, attempts to drive up scores result in a *reduction* in quality. If this is indeed the case, the argument could be made that such strategies are not only dishonest but unethical.

**Research that is world leading . . .**

It is generally and widely agreed that research performance is the most important indicator of a top university, and that a high score in the government-sponsored REF assessment is the most valid measure of what it terms ‘world-leading’ research. In fact, we have reached a point in the UK where the concept of world-leading research is *defined* by the REF star rating system, to the extent that most UK university mission statements now express an almost identically worded aspiration to conducting ‘research that is world leading’ (Swansea University, 2015). Furthermore, REF scores are the major criterion for the allocation of government research funding, and so it is hardly surprising that vast resources are poured by most universities into attempts to increase their scores. Strategies for improving scores include recruiting new research-active staff, supporting existing staff with their projects and grant applications, and resourcing the research infrastructure of the department. To this extent, REF scores are an indication of actual research activity.

However, other strategies are little more than deceptive sleights of hand, equivalent to pulling coins out of ears, that do little or anything to improve quality. As with the coin illusion, the eyes are deceived whilst the brain knows very well that it is a deception, but as everyone is performing the same trick, no one is inclined to break the spell. For example, it is widely recognized that judgments about the quality of research papers are to some extent based on the quality of the journals in which they are published, and judgements about the journals are based largely on impact factor scores and other metrics. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to target their papers at high impact journals, and journals in turn employ various strategies to improve their impact factors. These editorial strategies include (but are certainly not limited to) deliberately selecting papers for publication that are judged more likely to be cited by other authors, encouraging authors to cite other papers from the same journal (so-called self-citations), and ‘phasing’ the publication of papers so that more are published earlier in the year to maximize the impact factor window.

None of these strategies is in itself dishonest, but the overall aim is to give the appearance of greater quality as measured by the metrics, sometimes without any actual improvement in ‘real’ objective quality. Clearly, the quality of a journal is unaffected by whether it publishes more papers at certain times of the year, and so to make a causal connection between the publication schedule of a journal and the quality of a university department’s research appears at first sight to be faintly ridiculous. However, we can trace a clear link between the decision taken by a journal to publish a bumper January edition in order to drive up its impact factor and the REF score of a department whose staff are directed to publish in that journal. From here, it is but a small step to claim that the REF score is solely a measure of the quality of the research rather than, in part, an artefact of a clever publishing strategy.

As we might expect, universities have devised numerous strategies for maintaining an impression of improving research quality whilst in fact making little tangible difference. For example, it was common practice before the last REF assessment exercise for departments to appoint external research fellows, eminent researchers who were not expected to make any substantive contribution to the work of the department beyond lending their name to it, as this was believed to demonstrate ‘esteem’. Interestingly,
esteem only became a concern for universities after it had been introduced as a REF criterion.

A strategy which has had particular implications for my own work and career is the directive to researchers to target grant applications at larger and more prestigious national projects rather than writing bids for smaller, locally funded, practice-oriented, collaborative action research or practitioner-led projects. At one point during the last REF cycle, my university refused to ‘sign off’ any small bids to charities, citing low status and low profit margins as the reasons. Although this strategy might result in fewer projects being undertaken due to stiffer competition, and although the larger projects might have less direct impact on practice, the calculus of the REF is that one large, national research grant counts for more than several small practice development projects. Furthermore, publications reporting on the findings and recommendations from these large funded projects will most likely be submitted to high impact factor journals which, by definition, will be read mostly by other researchers and academics rather than at the lower status professional journals which are read by practitioners. Thus, although the findings and recommendations might well be cited by other authors, they are less likely to be seen and implemented by practising nurses.

We can see, then, that it is theoretically possible for a university department to make claims about research quality based on improved REF scores that are, in fact, mostly the result of clever strategies such as the targeting of publications and the appointment of associate staff. Worse still, some of these strategies might not only have no benefit to the quality of the research carried out in the department, they might result in fewer projects that are less beneficial to patients and service users.

An outstanding student experience...

If the research agendas of most UK universities are oriented towards the REF, the teaching agendas are currently focussed on the recruitment and retention of students. In a market economy where the customer is increasingly always right, this means enticing students by appearing to offer what they want, which apart from a pleasant environment and comfortable accommodation, is a qualification that will lead to a good, well-paid job. For example, the Dearing Report from 1997 included a postal survey of 1270 students, and revealed that 47% considered the most important reason for entering higher education was to get a better job or a vocational qualification, with only 15% saying that they were at university primarily because they were interested in the subject they were studying (Dearing, 1997). Two later surveys produced similar findings. A study by Warwick Institute for Employment Research (2006) of 130 000 students who were about to start university found that 57% cited job or career plans as their main reason for going to university, with only 17% going primarily because they were interested in studying a particular subject. Similarly, a National Union of Students (2008) survey found that the top three reasons cited by students for going to university were to gain qualifications, to improve their chances of getting a job and to improve their earning potential. Going to university ‘for the experience’ came a poor fourth.

This perception by students of what a university is for is reflected in many mission statements, including that of my university, which promises to ‘deliver an outstanding student experience…that produces global graduates educated and equipped for distinguished personal and professional achievement’ (Swansea University, 2015). Despite the recent addition of the word ‘educated’ to the mission, this is the language of the market rather than of the academy, concerned with production and delivery rather than teaching and learning. As prospective students (and their parents, who often regard their children’s higher education as a significant financial investment) become ever more sophisticated customers who are prepared to shop around for the best value for their fees, they are turning increasingly to consumer guides in the form of league tables. Along with scores in the National Student Survey (NSS) on

1The word ‘educated’ has only recently been added to this mission statement, shortly after I pointed out (Rolfe, 2013) the absurdity of a university mission that did not include a commitment to education.
satisfaction with their courses, the statistics which have the greatest influence on student choice include degree completion rates and the percentage of students achieving a ‘good’ degree, defined in the UK as a 2.1 or a First.

It is unsurprising, then, that universities in the UK have turned their attention to strategies for improving both grades and completion rates, with notable success. In a recent speech, the government minister for universities and science pointed out that there has been a 300% increase in the percentage of first class degrees awarded since the 1990s, and that over 70% of graduates now get a First or 2.1 compared to just 47% 20 years ago (Johnson, 2015). These figures might simply be a resounding endorsement of an extremely successful strategy for raising academic standards, although the minister expressed some doubts that this was the sole explanation for the increase. Furthermore, a recent survey of more than 2000 academic staff found that 46% had experienced pressure to inflate student grades or to avoid failing students in the last 3 years (Guardian, 2015), fuelling suspicions that strategies to increase grades and reduce student failures might not in all cases be concerned with raising academic standards. In addition, the eminent and well-respected educationalist Graham Gibbs has observed that:

The key problem appears to be that there has been little to stop grade inflation. The external examiner system has not proved capable of maintaining the standards that are applied by markers to whatever quality of student work is being assessed. As a consequence degree classifications cannot be trusted as indicators of the quality of outcomes. (Gibbs, 2010, p. 38, my emphasis)

In the light of this clear statement that educational quality cannot be measured by degree classifications, it would seem that many students place more value on a 70% chance of a good degree than on the quality of their education when choosing a university. It appears also that many universities are happy to pander to the desire for good grades by pressurizing their staff into maintaining this somewhat dubious ‘quality metric’.

At the time of writing, the UK government is poised to introduce a Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) along similar lines to the REF. Although there is currently a great deal of speculation as to how teaching quality is to be measured, the minister for universities and science has already revealed that it will include ‘outcome-focused’ metrics and offer universities ‘incentives’ to improve teaching quality (Times Higher Education, 2015b), possibly related to tuition fees. David Willetts, a former government minister, has expressed an interest in Gibbs’ Higher Education Academy report cited above, which suggests a number of possible metrics for assessing quality, including class size, numbers of lecturers with teaching qualifications, staff/student ratios, and student retention and employability statistics (Gibbs, 2010). Whilst Gibbs argues articulately that the assessment of quality is a complex process and that metrics do not provide a complete picture, it is likely that the TEF will follow much the same template as the REF. If that is the case, then I predict that before long, universities will be setting up committees and working groups to determine strategies for optimizing employability statistics and for improving staff : student ratios and decreasing class sizes without increasing the numbers of teaching staff.

A matter of life and death

I have suggested that Universities in the UK (and probably elsewhere in the world) are under increasing pressure to compete against each other for income in the form of student fees, research grants, and other government and industry funding. The relative quality of universities is quantified and compared in various league tables for research, teaching, and student satisfaction, and it is therefore unsurprising that a great deal of time, money, and effort is invested in enhancing league table positions. I have also suggested that movement up and down the tables does not always reflect changes in the actual quality of teaching and research insofar as it impacts on students and the users and recipients of research findings.

Strategies employed by universities for improving those metrics which are used as proxy measures of quality are mostly devised at executive level, but their implementation usually falls to individuals.
Thus, academic staff might well find themselves under pressure to pursue areas of research which hold no particular interest or relevance for them, rather than freely following their own interests and inclinations; to spend their time applying for highly competitive grants which they are statistically unlikely to get rather than actually doing research; to publish in journals with high impact factors read mostly by other researchers, rather than professional journals read by practitioners who are more likely to implement the findings; to ensure that students remain in their comfort zone rather than intellectually and emotionally challenging them; to conform to marking criteria and standards designed to inflate grades; and even to maximize the possibility for a struggling student to pass assignments by allowing third and, in some cases, fourth attempts. These are all pressures which I have either experienced myself or have heard first-hand from trustworthy sources, and all involve a degree of deception insofar as they are attempts to give the false appearance of improving quality by enhancing league table positions.

It could, of course, be argued that these deceptions are largely inconsequential; that it matters little whether the league tables are measuring anything real, indeed, whether they are measuring anything at all. After all, all that is actually at stake is pride and profit. Equally, we could question whether the effects resulting from strategies to drive up league table positions, such as grade inflation or artificially raised student completion rates, have any discernable impact on real life and, indeed, whether it matters. It could also be argued (as, indeed, it has been) that universities are first and foremost competitive businesses, and that jobs are at stake if they fail to compete in the market. In the artificial, ivory tower world of higher education, perhaps the most important thing for students, academics, and administrators alike is to recognize that a game is being played, to play it according to whichever rules are currently in force, and to achieve the best outcome possible.

For staff and students in departments of English literature or mediaeval history, there might be some truth in this argument. However, in departments of engineering or nursing, any slippage of educational standards could result in bridges collapsing and patients dying. For example, accepting unmotivated and perhaps unsuitable applicants, albeit with good A-level grades, onto nursing degrees because of pressure to meet recruitment targets, facilitating struggling student nurses to pass their assignments and to qualify as registered nurses when, in previous times, they would have been asked to leave the course, and giving priority to ‘student satisfaction’ by avoiding uncomfortable or confrontational learning situations can all have long-term consequences which might be ignored in the face of pressure to meet short-term targets. In each of these cases, education really is a matter of life and death.

## Becoming subversive

So what is to be done? How can the nurse academic resolve the tensions between the contractual demands of the university to meet objectives and performance indicators devised primarily to improve league table scores, and the professional and ethical obligations to place the wellbeing of individual patients and society at large as their most important consideration? Four possible responses are outlined below. This is not an exhaustive list; they are simply approaches that I have employed over the years with various degrees of effectiveness.

My initial response at a time when I still believed that education was an unequivocal force for good and that universities were all on the side of the angels was simply to deny that there was a problem. However, as time went on and higher education institutions came under increasing financial pressure, it became more and more difficult to feign astonishment that my university had succumbed to the same pursuit of targets and profit as any other business organization. Unfortunately, as we have seen with banks, hospitals and various large corporations, mis-selling, malpractice, and tax avoidance are not uncommon in the business sector and public institutions, and there is no reason why we might nowadays expect universities to act any differently.

A second response might be to accept such behaviour as normal practice and to go along with it. I could argue that the university is my employer and that I am contractually obliged to meet its objectives,
provided that they fall within the law, even if they were not the objectives of the university when I originally signed my contract. There is nothing illegal or even immoral about grade inflation, about targeting publications to specific journals, or even about accepting unsuitable but well qualified students onto nursing courses, and if I am unhappy with what I am now being expected to do, I always have the option of leaving. Such a position appeals not only to the deontological ethics of always keeping a promise, in this case a signed contract, but also to the utilitarian concept of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, where happiness is aligned with freedom from pain (Mill, 1861). For example, I could reason that the unlikely event of harm coming to a patient as a result of passing a nursing student who would otherwise have failed is outweighed by the pain caused by possible job losses due to poor performance in league tables and the consequent loss of income to the university. Furthermore, I might draw on the Aristotelian ethic of personal flourishing by claiming that I owe it to myself and to my family to toe the line, win promotion and prosper in my life and career, thereby fulfilling my potential as a person. However, from the existentialist ethical position of Heidegger or Sartre, such a stance might be considered to be in bad faith, as a dishonest rationalization in order to avoid unnecessary and unpleasant confrontation.

Thirdly, I might speak out against what I see as unjust and possibly dangerous practices. I might argue that it is ethically wrong to allow students who have not met the prescribed academic standards to remain on the course, that it is unjust to other more able students and also unfair to expect academic staff to lower their own standards in order to meet spurious objectives set by managers and administrators. In other words, I can stand up and be counted and perhaps in extreme cases, even blow the whistle on falling standards and dubious practices. I might even fall back on my professional code of conduct in my claim that my duty as a nurse outweighs my obligations to my employer. For example, the code instructs me to ‘put the interests of people using or needing nursing or midwifery services first’. It further compels me to ‘make their care and safety your main concern and make sure that their dignity is preserved and their needs are recognized, assessed and responded to’ (UKCC, 2015, p. 4). And if my employer suggests that these principles do not apply to nurses working in educational settings, I could inform him that ‘while you can interpret the values and principles set out in the Code in a range of different practice settings, they are not negotiable or discretionary’ (UKCC, 2015, p. 2). Whilst I can vouch from personal experience that this stance has been successful in extreme cases, it is neither effective nor sustainable in everyday academic life.

Fourthly, I can practice what I have described elsewhere as subversion (Rolfe, 2013), which I have defined as the attempt gently to undermine the corporate mission of the university. As I point out:

Despite the commonly held understanding of the verb ‘to subvert’ as to overthrow or to destroy, its Latin roots suggest an undermining or a change of direction or influence from below. Thus, I am not arguing for the overthrow of the corporate university; the call to subversion is not revolutionary in the sense of bringing down the system … Subversion can only effectively be carried out from within; it is the attempt to bend the current structures and mechanisms of the university to breaking point, but no further. (Rolfe, 2013, p. 52)

There are as many ways of subverting the university and its mission as there are people willing to subvert it. Even the most mildly subversive academics will be familiar with the adage that it is easier to obtain forgiveness than permission, which is an incitement to ‘do the right thing’ and apologize afterwards. Generally speaking, however, subversion is concerned with means rather the ends, with intrinsic academic values rather than extrinsic market value. It has not always been possible to side-step my contractual obligation to add value to whichever academic products my university is promoting at the time, and it is in no one’s interest to compromise its reputation and financial security. I have nevertheless often been able to find imaginative ways to satisfy the demands of the various KPIs, REFs, NSSs, and other quantitative indicators which demonstrate that my university is ‘world leading’ without compromising my own academic values and professional obligations as a nurse.
Conclusion

Of all the responses mentioned above, subversion is probably the least defensible in terms of ethical principles, whilst also being the most effective. Indeed, it is perhaps an ethical conundrum that the best approach I have found for challenging the deceptive practices of the university is through deceptive practices of my own. Kant described honesty as a sacred and unconditional command of reason, even when a white lie might be more likely to produce a positive outcome. I have suggested in this study that most reasonable people would regard honesty as far more morally ambiguous than Kant and would probably subscribe to the view that, at certain times and in certain circumstances, a positive end justifies dubious means. Whilst endorsing and encouraging this view, I nevertheless hold fast to the somewhat contrary position that, in the ivory towers of the academy and also in the ‘real world’ of everyday nursing, basing our practice on sound ethical and professional values rather than on the achievement of measurable outcomes often delivers more important and significant results which, in the long run, meet the aims of the institution in a more honest and authentic way.

References


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