

# Writing ourselves: creating knowledge in a postmodern world

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**In an attempt to encourage nurses and academics to write, there have been some recent journal papers that outline rules and guidelines for successful publication. This paper attempts to tackle the 'why' of writing rather than the 'how', and argues that writing is more than merely the representation of speech. Rather, writing is a creative act in which knowledge is produced as part of the process of writing itself, and at this level we might talk not merely of writing, but of *writing*. It is further argued that whereas the verb 'to write' always has an object (we write a book or an essay), the verb 'to write' is intransitive; it has no object. We do not write a paper, we merely write. We might, of course, choose to publish our *writing*, but it is done as an afterthought; we write for discovery, not for presentation. The act of *writing* is then compared to the act of teaching, and it is concluded that in order to teach, we must also write. Finally, this paper is offered as an example of *writing* (not an exemplar – there are as many ways to write as there are writers), and attempts to pull together material from a variety of sources including sociology, psychology, philosophy and literature as an act of discovery, of creating what I know about *writing* as I write.**

## WRITING AND SPEECH

Nursing, I<sup>1</sup> have heard it said many times (but have rarely seen it written), is an oral tradition. When nurse education made the transition from the discourse of nursing to the discourse

of higher education, it carried that tradition with it, and while there is a growing number of nurse educationalists who are writing academic papers, they are still very much a minority.

Several writers have attempted to address this problem in recent years. For example, Philip Burnard (1995) published a paper in this journal outlining the 'rules and skills of writing for publication', noting that:

The fact that the government runs a three-yearly exercise to monitor departmental productivity and the fact that part of that exercise involves an assessment of the department's publication means that nurse teachers not only have to teach: they must also publish. (p 117)

For Burnard, the government's research assessment exercise (RAE) was a major justification for writing and publishing academic work, and writing was therefore validated as the means to the end of securing a good RAE score and earning money and prestige for the writer's university department.

Whilst writing for the RAE is a commendable and necessary aim, and whilst I feel sure that Burnard recognizes other aims of writing, in this paper I intend to suggest a rather different set of reasons why all academics (and, indeed, all nurses) must write. I will argue that writing is not just a means to an end, whether that end be a paper, a textbook or the RAE, but that it is also an end in itself; in short, that writing has intrinsic value as an academic activity and that it is essential to our development as tutors, lecturers and nurses. This paper, then, is not about *how* to write, which Burnard has already thoroughly and ably covered, but about *why* to write; in the face of claims that nursing is an oral tradition, it is a defence of writing, and more importantly (as we shall see), of *writing*.

But why, it might be asked, is writing so important? After all, there is a trend in nursing at the moment towards promoting and valuing tacit knowledge that cannot be expressed in words. Textbooks, it is claimed, can only take us so far; as experienced practitioners we move beyond written rules and procedures and rely on a form of intuition that Benner (1984) referred to as expertise.

Or perhaps the value of writing is in preserving the spoken word, just as a student's written lecture notes attempt to preserve the spoken lecture, or published conference proceedings attempt to preserve the papers delivered at the conference. But these examples presuppose a correspondence between speech and text, that what is written acts merely as a permanent record of what has been said (either outwardly, or in the case of a journal paper, in the head of the writer).

<sup>1</sup> For reasons that I hope will later become apparent, the first person will be used throughout this text when I refer to myself. When I refer to others, the female pronoun will be used as a matter of convenience. This should not, of course, be taken to imply that all nurses or lecturers are women, and I look forward to the creation of a simple non-gender specific pronoun.

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This traditional view, in which 'writing is nothing but the representation of speech' (Rousseau 1913), was referred to by the post-structuralist Jacques Derrida (1976) as 'phonocentrism'. I wish to argue here, along with Derrida, that the act of speech and the act of writing are fundamentally different intellectual (and, of course, physical) actions. Roland Barthes (1977), another post-structuralist, illustrated this difference when he wrote of the 'odour of speech'. Thus:

As soon as one has finished speaking, there begins the dizzying turn of the image: one exalts or regrets what one has said, the way in which one said it, one *imagines oneself* (turns oneself over in image); speech is subject to remanence, it *smells*. (p 204)

On the other hand:

Writing has no smell: produced (having accomplished its process of production), it *falls*, not like a bellows deflating but like a meteorite disappearing; it will *travel* far from my body, yet without being something detached and narcissistically retained like speech; its disappearance holds no disappointment; it passes, traverses, and that's all. (Barthes 1977, p 204)

When I speak, my words linger like a bad smell. I turn them over in my mind. I ask myself why I said X rather than Y. My words haunt and embarrass me long after their sound has faded away. As Barthes (1977) wrote: 'the time of speech exceeds the act of speech'. In contrast, once I have written a text, once it is exactly how I want it, it is gone: it travels far from my body like a meteorite falling. The smell of the words I spoke at conferences 5 years ago still lingers; I can still remember how I felt at the moment of saying them. Papers I wrote 5 years ago are long forgotten; if I reread them it is as if they were written by someone else. As Virginia Woolf (1978) pointed out, the self who writes is different from the self who later reads what is written. This objectification of the text is intensified when our writing is published, and:

More so than long-hand writing, printed text is an object. We sense this in the greater ease with which we can take distance from our text once it has been converted into type-faced print. (Van Manen 1990, p 129)

Why should this be? Why does speech smell in such a way? Barthes' (1977) answer was that speech slips from the tongue almost before we realize it has gone, and once gone, is irreversible: 'a word cannot be *retracted*, except precisely by saying that one retracts it'. Text, however, is refined and perfected before it leaves

the writer's protection, before it is made public. Thus, speech is the immediate and unmediated verbalization of thought, whereas a text is organized, justified, supported by reasoned argument. In speech, we jump around from point to point, we 'um' and 'er', we attack a point from several angles at once.

The correcting and improving movement of speech is the wavering of a flow of words, a weave which wears itself out catching itself up, a chain of argumentative corrections which constitutes the favoured abode of the unconscious part of our discourse. (Barthes 1977, p 191)

In writing, however, we set out our thoughts in an orderly fashion, we are rational, the 'unconscious part of our discourse' is mediated and censored by the conscious. Thus, 'writing ... taps the unconscious; it can make the implicit explicit, and therefore, open to analysis' (Holly 1989). Speech and text are not the same, and when we write we are not merely recording the (internally or externally) spoken word, we are doing something quite different.

## WRITING AND WRITING

I do not, of course, wish to deny the descriptive function of writing. Description and accurate recording are essential for the continuation of all but the most basic cultures, and progress, in the sense that it is usually understood in the West, is impossible without them. I wish to argue, however, that writing has certain other functions beyond the descriptive and the archival which are just as important, and I will now examine two of these functions in greater detail.

Firstly, writing can be seen as a 'coming to understand', a way of checking out and making sense of what we think we know. Thus, 'writing teaches us what we know, and in what way we know what we know' (Van Manen 1990). This is writing as analysis; a breaking down of knowledge in order to understand it. Of course, part of our reason as educationalists for requiring students to write essays is concerned with the archival or descriptive function of writing: we wish to test their knowledge, or more accurately, their ability to describe an aspect of the world as they see it. This is the summative element of the essay. But if the purpose of writing an essay was merely to assess what a student knows, then it would be a sterile and educationally suspect exercise.

Thus, the other part of our reason for requiring students to write essays is concerned

with the analytic 'coming to understand' function of writing described above. In writing an essay, a student comes to recognize and make sense of what she knows. In the process of writing, knowledge is transformed into understanding as the student is forced to confront and rationalize an aspect of the world. This is the formative element of the essay: writing as a *means* to learning rather than merely as evidence of what has already been learnt.

Secondly, and more importantly, writing is a creative act. In writing we not only describe and come to understand our knowledge, but we can, in certain circumstances, construct it as we write such that 'not until we had written this down did we quite know what we knew' (Van Manen 1990). This is writing as synthesis, the building up of something new from a variety of components. Many of us, I feel sure, have had this experience of not knowing quite what we are going to write until the very act of writing itself, and have been surprised by what emerged on the paper. The text you are now reading is primarily an attempt on my part to understand the nature of writing, to organize my thoughts on the subject. But it is also an effort to say something new, and what has emerged is not what I had originally intended to write; the ideas were formed during the act of writing itself. Thus, 'if we start by freely writing about the issue that concerns us, we will find ourselves expressing things not previously thought of' (Ferrucci 1982).

This creative aspect of writing has been recognized by a number of social scientists as an important element of the research process. We write not only to record and make sense of the findings of research, but also as a way of constructing theory and knowledge in their own right. For example:

It is not altogether fanciful to suggest that the act of 'interpretation' in interpretative sociology is as much an act of writing, of the organization of sociological texts, as it is a matter of cognitive processes of understanding. (Hammersley & Atkinson 1983, p 209)

The process of knowledge generation in empirical research therefore continues after the data have been collected, and even after analysis has taken place. Schatzman & Strauss (1973), for example, have argued that it continues right up until the researcher has finished writing up the findings:

In preparing for any telling or writing, and in imagining the perspective of his specific audience, the researcher is apt to see his data in new ways: finding new analytic possibilities, or implications he has never before sensed. This process of late discovery is full

of surprises, sometimes even major ones, which lead to serious reflection on what one has 'really' discovered. Thus, it is not simply a matter of the researcher writing down what is in his notes or head; writing or telling as activities exhibit their own properties *which provide conditions for discovery*. (p 132, my emphasis)

Barthes (1977) took this argument even further to suggest that the processes of research and writing are inseparable, and that 'research is then the name which prudently, under the constraint of certain social conditions, we give to the activity of writing'. Writing can therefore be seen as a form of research in its own right, perhaps as the most basic and elementary form: it is an interrogation of the self which aims to uncover/create new knowledge and theory.

Van Manen (1990) argued not only that writing, what he called 'textual labor', was an essential part of the research act, but also that it was equally important to reflection-on-action or what many nurses refer to as reflective practice. Reflection, he claimed, demands a certain form of consciousness, 'a consciousness that is created by the act of literacy: reading and writing'. Thus, 'writing is closely fused into the research activity and reflection itself'.

This brings us back to the differences between speech and text discussed earlier. Text is not simply a written form of speech, but is something quite different which requires a different form of consciousness. Furthermore, as Van Manen pointed out above, it is a form of consciousness that is *created* by the act of writing: when we write, we are thinking in a different way. Van Manen (1990) continued by attempting to describe how writing creates this 'reflective cognitive stance':

Writing fixes thought on paper. It externalizes what is in some sense internal; it distances us from our immediate lived involvements with the things of our world. As we stare at the paper, and stare at what we have written, our objectified thinking stares back at us. Thus, writing creates the reflective cognitive stance that generally characterizes the theoretic attitude in the social sciences. The object of human science research is essentially a linguistic project: to make some aspect of our lived world, of our lived experience, reflectively understandable and intelligible. (pp 125-126)

This suggestion that writing somehow creates the state of mind necessary to write, that our actions determine our cognitive state which in turn facilitates those very actions, is reminiscent of psychological behaviourism and

the notion that, for example, we can lift a depression by 'pulling ourselves together' or 'pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps' and acting as if we are not depressed. In fact, this notion of 'bootstrapping' can be seen not only in behavioural therapy but also in early behaviourist descriptions of creativity and innovation:

One natural question often raised is, how do we ever get new verbal creations such as a poem or a brilliant essay? The answer is that we get them by manipulating words, shifting them about until a new pattern is hit upon ... How do you suppose Patou builds a new gown? Has he any 'picture in his mind' of what the gown is to look like when it is finished? He has not ... He calls his model in, picks up a new piece of silk, throws it around her, he pulls it in here, he pulls it out there ... He manipulates the material until it takes on the semblance of a dress ... Not until the new creation aroused admiration and commendation, both his own and others, would manipulation be complete ... The painter plies his trade in the same way, nor can the poet boast of any other method. (Watson 1925, p 198)

We create something new not by thinking about it, but by doing it: we write by writing. But lest you dismiss this as mechanical and reductionist, here is C. Wright Mills, one of the most creative postwar sociologists, talking about what he called 'intellectual craftsmanship':

As you rearrange [your writings], you often find that you are, as it were, loosening your imagination. Apparently this occurs by means of your attempt to combine various ideas and notes on different topics. It is a sort of logic of combination, and 'chance' sometimes plays a curiously large part in it. (Mills 1959, p 221)

It is clear that these two very disparate writers, a behavioural psychologist and an antiempirical sociologist, are saying much the same thing: that creative ideas occur at the time of the mechanical process of giving them shape. Our prior reading and experiences are the raw materials, but they are only turned into knowledge as we write.

The act of creation is therefore in the doing, and the creative state of mind, Van Manen's 'reflective cognitive stance' and Mills' 'loosening of the imagination', is engendered by the act of creation itself. Watson's dress designer manipulates the silk until he comes up with something original. Mills' intellectual craftsman (sic) rearranges her writing and combines various ideas until a new focus emerges, often

largely by 'chance'. It is not chance, of course, or else we would all be famous dress designers and sociologists. But the point is that ideas often only crystallize during the physical act of writing them down. It is not enough merely to think or to speak: we must write.

The sociologist Howard Becker (1986) described the creative act of writing as a sustained process of *rewriting* draft after draft, and noted that creative writing is writing for discovery, not for presentation. We are writing not for others but for ourselves, and at this level we might talk not merely of writing, but of *writing*. The writer writes to be read (usually by others), for presentation; the *writer writes* for the insights to be gained from the *writing*, for discovery. Writing is a means to an end; *writing* has intrinsic value and is an end in itself.

### THE WRITER IS DEAD; LONG LIVE THE WRITER

In 1968, Roland Barthes made the transition from structuralism to post-structuralism by announcing the death of the author (Barthes 1977). Because a text, once written, falls away from its author 'like a meteorite', so that author no longer 'owns' the text, it therefore becomes public property and subject to 'readings' by whomsoever comes across it. It makes no sense, claimed Barthes, to attempt to elicit the meaning that the author ascribed to the text, because there is no single 'objective' meaning. As Derrida (1976) claimed, we live in a 'decentred universe' without fixed points and absolutes. Thus, it is the task of the reader (perhaps we should say, of the *reader*) to provide her own interpretation, her own reading. The reader therefore 'deconstructs' the text and thereby creates it anew. As Barthes pointed out, the death of the author entails the birth of the reader as the creative force in literature.

But we can take this argument a step further, particularly in relation to technical, scientific or academic texts (which Barthes did not consider). We might, as academics, deconstruct or read our own meaning into a scientific paper or a research report, but the creative act is really only complete when we *write* our reading, when we recreate (reconstruct) the text on paper. Ironically, then, the death of the writer leads us logically to the birth of the *writer*.

This notion of rewriting texts for ourselves is taken to the extreme in a (possibly tongue-in-cheek or 'ironic') short story by the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges (1981). In this story, entitled 'Pierre Menard, Author of the *Quixote*', Borges imagines a 20th century writer named Pierre Menard who attempts to

rewrite Cervantes' book *Don Quixote*.

He did not want to compose another *Quixote* – which is easy – but *the Quixote itself*. Needless to say, he never contemplated a mechanical transcription of the original; he did not propose to copy it. His admirable intention was to produce a few pages which would coincide – word for word and line for line – with those of Miguel de Cervantes. (Borges 1981, pp 65–66)

Borges tells us that the first method that Menard conceived was relatively simple: 'Know Spanish well, recover the Catholic faith, fight against the Moors or the Turk, forget the history of Europe between the years 1602 and 1918, be Miguel de Cervantes'. However, this method was discarded in favour of the far more difficult task of 'to go on being Pierre Menard and reach the *Quixote* through the experiences of Pierre Menard'.

Menard finally managed to recreate, word for word, 'the ninth and thirty-eighth chapters of the first part of *Don Quixote* and a fragment of chapter twenty-two'. Furthermore, 'although Cervantes's text and Menard's are verbally identical ... the second is almost infinitely richer'.

The story is written partly as a joke or parody. However, it forcibly makes the point that in order to really know a text, it is (almost) necessary to rewrite it from your own experience. Although Borges first published this story in the 1950s, well before Barthes announced the death of the author, it is interesting to note that in the preface to the 1981 edition, André Maurois wrote that:

this subject, apparently absurd, in fact expresses a real idea: the *Quixote* that we read is not that of Cervantes, any more than our *Madame Bovary* is that of Flaubert. Each twentieth-century reader involuntarily rewrites in his own way the masterpieces of past centuries. (Maurois 1981, p 12)

I am merely (like Borges) taking this argument to its logical conclusion: that in order fully to engage with a text, any text (and how can we teach if we do not engage with what we teach?), the reader must *literally* rewrite it, or rather, *rewrite* it. This should not entail a word-for-word mechanical transcription, nor an attempt to replicate the text *à la* Menard, but perhaps a writing *about* the text as a way of coming to understand it and, more importantly, of pushing its ideas further than did the original author. Each individual reading of a text therefore has the potential to become a text itself.

Taken to its extreme, this post-structuralist approach to writing brings us to postmod-

ernism. Derrida (1976) famously proclaimed that 'there is nothing outside the text', and the postmodernists interpreted this literally to mean that the world can be 'read' (interpreted) in the same way as a book. Another of Borges' short stories, again written in the 1950s but showing a stunning prescience, illustrates this attitude perfectly.

In his story 'The Library of Babel', Borges imagined the world as an immense (and possibly infinite) library made entirely of hexagonal rooms:

There are five shelves for each of the hexagon's walls; each shelf contains thirty-five books of uniform format; each book is of four hundred and ten pages; each page, of forty lines, each line, of some eighty letters which are black in colour. There are also letters on the spine of each book; these letters do not indicate or prefigure what the pages will say. (Borges 1981, p 79)

Most of the books comprise a random jumble of letters, but occasionally a book would be found which contained one or more comprehensible words.

One which my father saw in a hexagon on circuit fifteen ninety-four was made up of the letters MCV, perversely repeated from the first line to the last. Another (very much consulted in this area) is a mere labyrinth of letters, but the next-to-last page says *Oh time thy pyramids*. (Borges 1981, p 80)

Over the years, the inhabitants of the Library (of the world) came to understand firstly that 'all the books ... are made up of the same elements: the space, the period, the comma, the twenty-two letters of the alphabet'; and secondly that 'in the vast Library, there are no two identical books'. This led to the inevitable conclusion that:

the Library is total and that its shelves register all the possible combinations of the twenty-odd orthographical symbols (a number which, though extremely vast, is not infinite): in other words, *all that it is given to express, in all languages*. Everything: the minutely detailed history of the future, the archangels' autobiographies, the faithful catalogue of the Library, thousands and thousands of false catalogues, the demonstration of the fallacy of those catalogues, the demonstration of the fallacy of the true catalogue, the Gnostic gospel of Basilides, the commentary on that gospel, the true story of your death, the translation of every book in all languages, the interpolations of every book in all books. (Borges 1981, pp 81–82, my emphasis)

This is Derrida's claim that there is nothing outside the text taken to its literal conclusion. The whole world is not only contained on the shelves of a library; the whole world is a library. It is, of course, quite impossible to imagine speech fulfilling the same role. Only text can generate all the possible permutations and combinations of letters to produce 'the translation of every book in all languages' merely by chance (or in this story, by necessity).

The promise is therefore one of infinite knowledge: all is written, if only we search for long enough. Furthermore:

It is verisimilar that these grave mysteries could be explained in words: if the language of the philosophers is not sufficient, the multiform Library will have produced the unprecedented language required, with its vocabularies and grammars. (Borges 1981, p 82)

But the curse is one of the uncertainty: how would we know the faithful catalogue of the Library amongst the 'thousands and thousands of false catalogues, the demonstration of the fallacy of those catalogues, the demonstration of the fallacy of the true catalogue'? Thus, the Library (the world) is also a 'feverish Library whose chance volumes are constantly in danger of changing into others and affirm, negate and confuse everything like a delirious divinity'. And ultimately, of course:

An *n* number of possible languages use the same vocabulary; in some of them, the symbol *library* allows the correct definition *a ubiquitous and lasting system of hexagonal galleries*, but *library* is *bread* or *pyramid* or anything else, and these seven words which define it have another value. You who read me, are You sure of understanding my language? (Borges 1981, p 85)

When we have access to everything, we can be certain of nothing. Furthermore, claimed Borges, the promise of truth and certainty is ultimately an illusion and the quest for it results in insanity.

Had it been written 40 years later, Borges' story might have been interpreted (read) as a comment about the growth of the Internet and the vast array of information to be found there (I recently heard a joke: it is said that a million monkeys randomly hitting the keys of a word processor would eventually produce something intelligible; the Internet has shown this not to be the case). Nevertheless, it certainly prefigured the postmodern stance of an attitude of total scepticism, of 'incredulity toward meta-narratives' (Lyotard 1984), and in particular towards the 'enlightenment narrative, in which

the hero of knowledge works toward a good ethico-political end – universal peace'.

In this statement, Lyotard was challenging what Habermas (1979) had referred to as the 'incomplete project' of modernity which started with the Enlightenment and had as its (as yet unfulfilled) end the rationalization of human society. But for Lyotard, history has no 'end', that is to say, no ultimate goal prescribed by a metanarrative. History is open-ended; there is no light at the end of the tunnel because there is no single tunnel and no single end, merely *writers*, each with her own torch, creating her own path through the darkness. And perhaps the same is true of nursing: there is no metanarrative, whether it be science or humanism/holism, and no end. The vision of nurses marching side-by-side to the end of the tunnel of 'health', 'holistic care' or whatever is perhaps simply an illusion perpetrated by those with the power to define and censure nursing knowledge.

## PULLING OUR SELVES TOGETHER

But if this is the case, then we must all *write*, and not necessarily for publication but for ourselves. *Writing* defines who we are and what we think, it is our own personal torch to (en)light(en) the darkness. Nor does it matter what we write. Content is, in a sense, unimportant since writing is an end in itself: '*to write* is an intransitive verb', claimed Barthes (1970), a verb without an object, an end in itself. We do not *write* books or papers, we just *write*. It is not *what* you write, but *how*, as Borges' story about the *Quixote* demonstrated. When we *write*, we are not merely creating ideas, we are creating ourselves; we *write* ourselves.

But what exactly does it mean to *write* ourselves? We have seen that *writing* is a creative act of synthesis, of pulling together disparate elements to construct something new. We can think of the self as an aggregation of thoughts, knowledge, opinions, attitudes, ideas and other mental states (as Descartes famously wrote: 'I think, therefore I am'), and as Ornstein (1987) pointed out:

the separate mental components have different priorities and are often at cross purposes, with each other and with life today, but they do exist and, more soberly, 'they' are us. (p 24)

Our *writing* therefore manifests our self (or, more accurately, our selves) on paper; it pulls together our disparate thoughts, attitudes and opinions and gives them a focus. To use the metaphor employed earlier, when we *write* we

are 'pulling ourselves (our selves) together'.

This notion of *writing* as the synthesis or manifestation of self is succinctly illustrated in the Translator's Preface to Derrida's book *Of Grammatology* (1976), where Spivak (the translator) briefly described Derrida's life and academic achievements, ending with a list of his published books. He concluded: 'Jacques Derrida is also this collection of texts'. Roland Barthes (1977) made a similar point, claiming 'I am writing a text and I call it R.B.' You are what you write.

To return to the claim I made at the start of this paper, that *writing* is essential to our development as tutors and lecturers (and indeed, as nurses), we can make a direct comparison between the act of *writing* and the act of teaching. Like *writing*, good teaching is also a form of synthesis, of pulling together knowledge and opinion from a variety of sources and offering it as a coherent package, a 'body' of knowledge. It is, of course, possible to teach solely from one or more books, but most experienced teachers offer their students a mix of 'book' knowledge and personal experience, knowledge and opinions, that is, something of themselves. Otherwise, we might just as well send our students off to read the books and all go home, reducing the function of universities as merely to award degrees.

Thus, in order to teach, we must synthesize, and in order to synthesize, we must *write*. For example, in order to teach a class on, say, action research, I must first pull together what I know about the subject. This includes what I have read in books, heard at conferences, learnt from supervising students' dissertations, experienced from doing my own research projects, and so on.

These 'elements' of what I know are, in a way, the dismembered parts of my unique body of knowledge about action research. I carry them all in my memory, but it is impossible (at least for *my* brain) to consider them all at the same time. It is only when I write them down that I can pull them together into a coherent body of knowledge and come to recognize the totality of what I know about action research (we have all, I am sure, had the experience of trying to follow a complex argument from a verbal conference presentation: statements made 5 minutes previously are forgotten; we cannot go back and review them. Our brains can only hold so many concepts at one time).

But often the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. When I see these disparate elements all together in one place, on one piece of paper, I begin to make connections between them. As Watson described earlier, I shift my words about until a new pattern is hit upon; as Mills claimed, I 'loosen my imagination' by combining various ideas on different topics. And this often results in something new: a new angle, a new theory, a new 'reading' which has only come about because I have 'objectified' my subjective thoughts by writing them down. If my teaching is to contain anything new, then I must *write*. I might submit my *writing* for publication, but that is not the reason why I *write*. I *write* in order to learn and I *write* in order to teach. As Becker (1986) said: 'this one is for discovery, not presentation'.

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